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TITLE 59 
REVENUE AND TAXATION 
Tax on Tangible Property, 59-1-1. 
Exemptions, 59-2-1 to 59-2-13. 
Definitions, 59-3-1. 
Situs, 59-4-1, 59-4-2. 
Assessment of Property, 59-5-1 to 59-5-82. 
Apportionment, 59-6-1 to 59-6-3. 
Equalization, 59-7-1 to 59-7-15. 
County Auditors' Duties, 59-8-1 to 59-8-10. 
Levies, 59-9-1 to 59-9-13. 
Collection of Taxes, 59-10-1 to 59-10-72. 
Miscellaneous Provisions, 59-11-1 to 59-11-16. 
Inheritance Tax, 59-12-1 to 59-12-44. 
Franchise and Privilege Taxes, 59-13-1 to 59-13-64. 
Individual Income Tax, 59-14-1 to 59-14-80. 
Sales Tax, 59-15-1 to 59-15-22. 
Use Tax, 59-16-1 to 59-16-25. 
Chain Store License, 59-17-1 to 59-17-9. 
Tobacco and Oleomargarine Licenses, 59-18-1 to 59-18-19. 
State 'fax System Committee, 59-19-1 to 59-19-7. 
CHAPTER 1 
TAX ON TANGIBLE PROPERTY 
Section 59-1-1. Ad valorem assessment-Intangibles exempt. 
59-1-1. Ad valorem assessment-Intangibles exempt.-All tangible 
property in this state, not exempt under the laws of the United States or 
under the Constitution of this state, shall be taxed in proportion to its 
value as hereinafter provided. Intangible property shall be exempt from 
ad valorem assessment, levy and taxation, but nothing in this title contained 
shall be construed to prevent the inclusion of income from property, whether 
tangible or intangible, in the basis of any tax upon, or measured by, income. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2501; 1. In general. 
C. L. 1917, § 5861; L. 1931, ch. 42, § 1; R. The first sentence of this section is 
S. 1933 & C. 1943, 80-1-1. a copy of the constitutional provision, 
Cross-References. 
Constitutional 
Const. Art. XIII. 
provisions generally, 
Indians' property, Const. Art. III, § 2. 
Nonresident citizens, taxation, Const. 
Art. III, § 2. 
Special tax laws forbidden, Const. Art. 
VI, § 26. 
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Art. XIII, § 2. McCornick & Co. v. Bas-
sett, 49 U. 444, 164 P. 852. 
2. Words and phrases defined. 
"Proportion," as used in first sentence 
of Const. Art. XIII, § 2, has reference 
to sameness or likeness in value of prop-
erty; that is, all property must be taxed 
at same relative value. State ex rel. Cun-
ningham v. Thomas, 16 U. 86, 50 P. 615. 
59-1-1 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
The word "value" is refened to in 
this section in a comparative manner. 
State v. Thomas, 16 U. 86, 89, 50 P. 615. 
3. The ta.xin~ power. 
State's power of taxation is not within 
application of, and is not limited by, 
Const. Art. I, § 22. Kimball v. Grantsville 
City, 19 U. 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L. R. A. 628, 
overruling Kaysville City v. Ellison, 18 
U. 163, 55 P. 386, 43 L. R. A. 81, 72 Am. 
St. Rep. 772. 
The right to impose taxes being one 
of necessity, and being a prerogative of 
the sovereign power, is never taken away 
by implication or by mere construction, 
but in order to be binding upon the 
sovereignty, must be surrendered in ex-
press terms. Salt Lake City v. Utah Light 
& Railway Co., 45 U. 50, 56, 142 P. 1067. 
The fixing of tax rates is a legislative 
and not a judicial function. Intermountain 
Title Guaranty Co. v. State Tax Comm., 
107 U. 222, 152 P. 2d 724, 726. 
The power to tax is purely a legisla-
tive function, and unless the legislature 
has provided for the taxation of the prop-
erty, any attempt to levy and assess a 
tax on the property is void. Crystal Car 
Line v. State Tax Comm., 110 U. 426, 174 
P. 2d 984, 987. 
4. Property subject to taxation generally. 
In order to relieve any species of 
property from its clue and just propor-
tion of burdens of government, language 
relied on, as creating exemption from tax-
ation, should be so clear as not to admit 
of reasonable controversy about its mean-
ing, since all doubts must be resolved 
against exemption . .Judge v. Spencer, 15 
U. 242, 48 P. 1097. 
Under Const. Art. XIII, § 2, all property 
in the state, not exempt by the laws of 
the United States or the Constitution of 
this state, is subject to taxation in pro-
portion to its value. Utah Metal & Tunnel 
Co. v. Groesbeck, 62 U. 251, 258, 219 P. 
248. 
5. - property of nonresidents. 
As against contention of foreign cor-
poration that taxation of its refrigerator 
<',ars in Utah was forbidden by federal 
Constitution because such cars had no 
situs in that state for purpose of taxation 
and tax on them would impose burden on 
interstate commerce, held that cars were 
taxable in Utah on basis of average num-
ber thereof used and employed by their 
owner in that state during year for which 
assessment was made. Union Refrigerator 
Transit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149, 44 
L. Ed. 708, 20 S. Ct. 631 (White, .J., not 
participating), aff'g 18 U. 378, 55 P. 639. 
Under this .se~tion, property brought 
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into state even temporarily by non-
resident corporation is taxable in county 
where used or located. Hamilton & 
Gleason Co. v. Emery County, 75 U. 406 
285 P. 1006. ' 
6. - capital stock. 
Capital stock is not taxable as such 
but property it represents is taxable. Utah'. 
Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake County, 60 
U. 491, 210 P. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874. 
7. - property of national bank. 
~11 of nonexempt local property of 
nat10nal bank, located in state, is, under 
U. S. Rev. Stats. § 5219, within state's 
power of taxation. Commercial Nat. Bank 
v. Chambers, 21 U. 324, 61 P. 560, 56 L. 
R. A. 346, aff'cl 182 U. S. 556, 45 L. Ed. 
1227, 21 S. Ct. 863. 
8. - doctrine of unity of use. 
The doctrine of unity of use for purpose 
of determining assessment for taxation 
cannot be applied to manufacturing or 
other similar plants or industries which 
may be under common ownership, but used 
or operated in different states. Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake County, 60 U. 491, 
210 P. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874. 
9. Exemptions, intangible property. 
. Socalled intangible property of corpora-
t10n should have been considered and 
taxed only so far as it enhanced value of 
tangible property. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. 
v. Salt Lake County, 60 U. 491, 210 P. 106, 
27 A. L. R. 874. 
Under prior constitutional provision 
(Art. XIII, § 2), good will, earning capac-
ity, productiveness of property and actual 
earnings, together with all matters that 
might enhance or influence value of tangi-
ble property could be considered by as-
sessing authorities in arriving at actual 
value of property for taxation, but could 
not be taxed or assessed separately under 
designation of "intangible," or "other per-
sonal property." Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. 
Salt Lake County, 60 U. 491, 210 P. 106, 
27 A. L. R. 874. 
Where the state holds title to land in 
its governmental capacity, the property is 
exempt from taxation under the constitu-
tional mandate. Duchesne County v. State 
Tax Comm., 104 U. 365, 140 P. 2d 335, 338. 
10. - mortgages. 
Prior to amendment of Const. Art. XIII, 
§ 3 in 1906, it was held that mortgages on 
real estate were not exempt from taxation, 
and could not be exempted therefrom by 
legislature . .Judge v. Spencer, 15 U. 242, 48 
P. 1097. 
In other words, prior to that date the 
legislature was, by our Constit\\t:ion 1 au-
EXEMPTIONS 59-1-1 
thorized to tax mortgages. Neilson v. 
San Pete County, 40 U. 560, 565, 123 P. 
334. 
Since 1906 mortgages have been exempt 
from and have not been assessed for taxa-
tion. Neilson v. San Pete County, 40 U. 
560, 565, 123 P. 334. 
Under former constitutional provision, 
title-retaining notes were held not em-
1/raced within constitutional provision ex-
empting mortgages from taxation. Still-
man v. Lynch, 56 U. 540, 192 P. 272, 12 
A. L. R. 552 .. 
It has always been the public policy of 
the people of this state to exempt mort-
gages from taxation, whether held by resi-
dents or nonresidents. McLaughlin v. 
Cluff, 66 U. 245, 240 P. 161, 42 A. L. R. 
347. 
11. Priorities. 
Under laws of Utah taxes for general 
governmental purposes are paramount to 
all other demands against property to 
which tax lien attaches. Ingraham v. Han-
son, 297 U. S. 378, 80 L. Ed. 728, 56 S. Ct. 
511, aff'g Millard County v. Millard 
County Drainage Dist. No. 1, 86 U. 475, 
46 P. 2d 423. 
The tax statutes are not designed to 
permit an owner of land who has a duty 
to pay the taxes, to neglect the perform-
ance of such duty until tax delinquencies 
mature into a tax title, and then purchase 
the tax title to wipe out his obligations 
to mortgagors or other lienholders. Free 
v. Farnworth, 105 U. 583, 144 P. 2d 532, 
535. 
12. Due process of la.w. 
It is not necessary to validity of tax in 
United States that there shall be regular 
judicial proceeding; nature of duties to be 
performed, usages of people, and necessi-
ties of government have established meth-
od of procedure, respecting taxation, dif-
ferent from that pursued in courts, and 
following of that different method has al-
ways been regarded as "due process of 
law." State ex rel. Jennings Bros. Inv. Co. 
v. Armstrong, 19 U. 117, 56 P. 1076. 
13. Judicial interference. 
Unless tax laW6 conflict with some con-
stitutional provision, either expressly or 
by implication, courts have no authority 
to prevent their execution. Kimball v. 
Grantsville City, 19 U. 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L. 
R. A. 628. 
Collateral References. 
Taxation@::;>4. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 7. 
Levy and assessment 51 Am. Jur. 614, 
Taxation § 647 et seq. ' 
Property subject to tax 51 Am. Jur. 
431, Taxation § 408 et seq.' 
Constitutionality of statute or ordinance 
authorizing use _of public funds, credit, or 
power of taxation for restoration or re-
pair of privately owned public utility 13 
A. L. R. 313. ' 
Easement as factor in p~operty taxation 
134 A. L. R. 963. ' 
E~couragement or promotion of industry 
not m_ nature of public utility, carried on 
by pri".ate enterprise, as public purpose 
for which tax may be imposed or public 
money appropriated, 112 A. L. R. 571. 
_En~meration of subjects of tax in con-
stituti?nal provision as exclusive of power 
of legislature to add other subjects 100 
A. L. R. 859. ' 
L~asehold estate in exempt property as 
su bJect of tax or special assessment, 23 A. 
L. R. 248. 
Mandamus as taxpayer's remedy in re-
spect of valuation of property for taxa-
tion, 131 A. L. R. 360. 
Right of one who pays taxes for which 
another is bound, to subrogation to the 
right of the taxing power 106 A. L. R. 
1212. ' · 
Scope and effect of express constitutional 
provi~ions prohibiting legislature from 
imposrng taxes for county and corporate 
purposes, or providing that legislature may 
rnvest power to levy such taxes in the local 
authorities, 46 A. L. R. 609. 
~axation of property the subject of 
bailment, 135 A. L. R. 597. 
Use of public funds or exercise of tax-
ing power to promote patriotism, 30 A. L. 
R. 1035. 
What is a property tax as distinguished 
from excise, license, and other taxes, 103 
A. L. R. 18. 
CHAPTER 2 
EXEMPTIONS 
Section 59-2-1. 
59-2-2. 
59-2-3. 
Property devoted to public, religious, charitable uses or irrigation. 
State lands-Improvements taxable. 
_Collection of tax on interest of purchaser-Certificate of sale-Effect 
of filed certificate. 
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59-2-1 REVENUE AND TAXA'l'ION 
59-2-4_ 
59-2-5-
Property in interstate commerce. 
Property owned by disabled veterans or their unmarried widows 0 1 
minor orphans-Amount of exemption. 
59-2-6. 
59-2-7. 
59-2-8. 
59-2-9. 
59-2-10. 
59-2-11. 
59-2-12. 
Application-Proof-Percentage of disability-Minimum allowed. 
Pumping planta for irrigation. 
Computation of power used for irrigation. 
Exemption to be prorated and paid to users. 
Rules by state tax commission. 
Household furnishings exempt from taxation. 
Exemption of property owned by blind persons or their unmarried 
widows or minor orphans-Amount. 
59-2-13. Procedure and conditions-Filing of application and statement as to 
vision-Maximum corrected vision allowed. 
69-2-1. Property devoted to public, religious, charitable uses or 1rn-
gatio,n,-The property of the United States, of this state, counties, cities, 
towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, lots 
with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship 
or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or used for private 
or corporate benefit, shall be exempt from taxation. Water rights, ditches, 
canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes 
and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating 
lands within this state owned by such individuals or corporations, or the 
individual members thereof, shall not be separately taxed as long as they 
shall be owned and used exclusively for such purposes. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2503; 
L. 1909, ch. 94, § 1; C. L. 1917, § 5863; R. 
S. 1933 & C. 1943, 80-Z-l. 
Cross-Ref ererices. 
Exemptions: 
agricultural college, 53-31-5. 
armories, 39-2-1. 
constitutional exemptions, Const. Art. 
XIII, § 2. 
exemptions reserved to United, States, 
Enabling Act, § 3. 
fraternal insurance societies, 31-29-34. 
school property generally, 53-4-12. 
schools for blind and deaf, 64-3-2, 64-
3-14. 
State Fair Association, 64-4-1. 
United States property exempt, Const. 
Art. III, § 2; Art. XIII, § 2. 
University of Utah, 53-30-4. 
1. Power of legislature. 
Legislature has no power to exempt 
from taxation property not exempt there-
from under Constitution. Judge v. Spencer, 
15 U. 242, 48 P. 1097, followed in State 
v. Armstrong, 17 U. 166, 170, 53 P. 981, 41 
L. R. A. 407. 
2. General construction. 
In order to relieve any species of prop-
erty from its due and just proportion of 
burdens of government, language relied on, 
as creating exemption from taxation, 
should be so clear as not to admit of rea-
sonable controversy about its meaning, 
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sinee all doubts must be resolved against 
exemption. Judge v. Spencer, 15 U. 242, 
48 P. 1097. 
Accordingly, court will not aid or en-
large exemptions from taxation by inter-
pretation. Judge v. Spencer, 15 U. 242, 
48 P. 1097. 
Legislation, claimed to grant immunity 
from taxation, will be strictly interpreted 
against exemption. Union Refrigerator 
Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18 U. 378, 55 P. 
639, aff'd 177 U. S. 149, 44 L. Ed. 708, 20 
S. Ct. 631. (White, J., not participating.) 
Provision of this section which exempts 
property used for educational, religiouR 
and charitable purposes should receive lib-
eral construction. Salt Lake Lodge No. 
85, Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks 
v. Groes.beck, 40 U. 1, 120 P. 192, Ann. 
Cas. 1914C, 940. See comment to this cleci-
sion in 25 Harvard Law Review, p. 670. 
3. Public property. 
Under this section property owned by 
cities is absolutely exempt, and depends 
upon no condition but ownership by the 
city. Springville v. Johnson, 10 U. 351, 
37 P. 577. 
Where state accepted deed of land from 
defaulting mortgagor, rather than fore-
close the mortgage given upon purchase 
of the land from the state, the state could 
not claim the land free from county taxes 
levied while the mortgagor had the title, 
since such would not be within listed 
exemption from taxation and would con-
EXEMPTIONS 59-2-1 
stitute an abatement of taxes. State v. 
Salt Lake County, 96 U. 464, 85 P. 2d 851. 
Where state accepted deed of land from 
defaulting mortgagor, rather than fore-
close the mortgage given upon the pur-
chase of the land from the state, the state 
could not claim the land free from county 
taxes levied while the mortgagor had the 
title, notwithstanding the deed antedated 
the auditor's tax deed given when the 
county bought in the land at the tax sale. 
State v. Duchesne County, 96 U. 482, 85 P. 
2d 860. 
Under this section lands, title to which 
is acquired by the state by foreclosure of 
mortgage or conveyance for the extinguish-
ment of a debt for money loaned from the 
state school fund, are exempt from taxa-
tion. This is partly due to the reason 
that the property is owned by the state 
in its governmental capacity, but accord-
ing to some of the judges it is due solely 
to the fact that such lands come within 
meaning of term "property" in constitu-
tional provision. Duchesne County v. State 
Tax Comm., 104 U. 365, 140 P. 2d 335. 
4. - of United States or its instrumental-
ity. 
While taxes imposed by state law may 
not be laid directly upon property or ac-
tivities of federal government itself or of 
any of its instrumentalities, private prop-
erty and interests may be subjected to 
taxation under state law even though they 
bear close relation to activities of United 
States. Salt Lake County v. Kennecott 
Copper Corp., 163 F. 2d 484. 
5. Tax of sale of electric power by city. 
Sales tax levying tax on sales of electri-
cal energy by municipality does not offend 
Const. Art. XIII, § 2, because city may 
pass tax on to consumer. But even 
thougb city is required to pay the tax, 
still such tax may not be said to be a tax 
on its property. State Tax Comm. v. City 
of Logan, 88 U. 406, 415, 54 P. 2d 1197. 
6. Property used for charitable purposes. 
Where fraternal order, purpose and 
object of which was to promote good fel-
lowship among its members and for charit-
able purposes, conducted social club for 
benefit of members, and part of clubroom 
was used as buffet where liquors, meals and 
cigars were sold to members, the net profits 
derived being devoted to charitable pur-
poses, it was held that clubhouse would be 
exempt from taxation. Salt Lake Lodge 
No. 85, Benevolent & Protective Order of 
Elks v. Groesbeck, 40 U. 1, 120 P. 192, 
Ann. Cas. 19140, 940. See comment to 
this decision in 25 Harvard Law Review, 
p. 670. 
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The question whether use of hospital 
property was charitable or was for pecu-
niary profit must, in the very nature of 
things, be determined and controlled by 
purpose of the hospital. 'fhe mere fact 
that the property is used for hospital 
purposes is not sufficient to exempt it from 
taxation, as all hospitals are not charitable 
institutions. They may be and often are 
maintained and conducted for pecuniary 
profit, and mere fact that hospital was 
established for care and treatment of sick 
and injured is not of itself controlling. 
William Budge Memorial Hospital v. 
Maughan, 79 U. 516, 3 P. 2d 258, 13 P. 2d 
1119. 
In determining whether a hospital is en-
titled to exemption from taxation under 
this section on the ground that it is used 
exclusively for "charitable purposes," the 
test is whether it is maintained for the 
purpose of charity or for profit, and if 
hospital is incorporated, the answer to 
that question depends upon its powers as 
defined in its charter as well as upon the 
manner in which it is conducted, and the 
corporation itself is concluded by the 
declaration of its charter in respect to its 
purpose and object. William Budge Memor-
ial Hospital v. Maughan, 79 U. 516, 3 
P. 2d 258, 13 P. 2d 1119. 
That incorporated hospital, o·rganized 
for profit, did not pay dividends but 
allowed earnings to accumulate which were 
appropriated to betterment of hospital 
property, is not indicative of either a 
benevolent or charitable purpose. William 
Budge Memorial Hospital v. Maughan, 79 
U. 516, 527, 3 P. 2d 258, 13 P. 2d 1119. 
A hospital incorporated, organized and 
conducted for profit is not entitled to 
exemption from taxation on the ground 
that it is used "exclusively" for "chari-
table purposes." Its object and purpose 
are conclusively established by its articles 
of incorporation, which cannot be contra-
dicted by parol or extrinsic evidence. Wil-
liam Budge Memorial Hospital v. Maughan, 
79 U. 516, 3 P. 2d 258, 13 P. 2d 1119. See 
fu1·ther annotations under Const. Art. XIII, 
§ 2. 
7. - extent of exemption. 
Exemption of property of benevolent 
society extends only to such part of that 
property as is occupied and used "exclu-
sively" for charitable purposes and not to 
part thereof held as source of revenue 
especially when value of e:ich such part 
of property is separately ascertainable. 
Parker v. Quinn, 23 U. 332, 64 P. 961. 
Under constitutional provision exempt-
ing property of charitable institution from 
taxation (now contained in section 2 but 
formerly appearing in section 3), it was 
held that where portion of certain prop-
59-2-1 REVENUE AND TAXATION 
erty owned by charitable institution was 
occupied and used by it for charitable 
purposes, and other portion thereof was 
rented to stores for purposes of revenue, 
portion used and occupied for charitable 
purposes was exempt, and portion rented 
out was subject to taxation. Odd Fellows' 
Bldg. Assn. v. Naylor, 53 U. lll, 177 P. 
214. 
8. Water in pipes of distributing system. 
Under a former statute it was held that 
a water system for selling water to inhabi-
tants of a city and used in conveying 
water from a river to such city was not 
exempt, because the water is not appurten-
ant to any land, but is personal property. 
Bear Lake & River Water Works & Irr. 
Co. v. Ogden City, 8 U. 494, 33 P. 135, 
applying 2 Comp. Laws 1888, § 2784, which, 
however, differs from second sentence of 
present section. 
9. Mining claims and mining products. 
Formerly mining claims and the products 
of mines and the ore in the mine.s were 
exempt. Mammoth Miu. Co. v. Juab 
County, 10 U. 232, 37 P. 348, citing 1 
Comp. Laws 1888, § 2009. 
Collateral References. · 
Taxation<§::::>197. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 391. 
Exemption from taxation, 51 Am. Jur. 
502, Taxation § 495 et seq. 
Bond or warrant of governmental sub-
division as subject of taxation or exemp-
tion, 44 A. L. R. 510. 
Charitable organizations, exemption from 
taxation, 62 A. L. R. 328. 
College fraternity house or dormitory, 
exemption, 54 A. L. R. 1381. 
Constitutional enumeration of subjects 
of tax exemption as affecting power of · 
legislature to free government securities 
or property from taxation, 9 A. L. R. 436. 
Constitutionality of exemption of par-
ticular educational, religious, or charitable 
institution, 2 A. L. R. 471. 
Constitutional or statutory tax exemp-
tion as applied to tax for purpose of re-
funding bonds issued after the exemption, 
to retire indebtedness incurred before the 
exemption, 102 A. L. R. 672. 
Construction of exemption of religious 
body or society from taxation or special 
assessment, 168 A. L. R. 1222. 
Discrimination between notes or obliga-
tions secured by real estate mortgage, and 
those unsecured, as regards property taxa-
tion or exemption therefrom, 129 A. L. R. 
682. 
Distinction between governmental and 
proprietary functions of state or its agency 
as affecting taxation, 155 A. L. R. 423. 
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Educational bodies or schools within con-
templation of exemption provisions, 95 A. 
L. R. 62. 
Equitable title under execut01'Y contract 
for purchase of real property as sustain-
ing exemption from taxation, 156 A. L. R. 
1301. 
Exemption from taxation of municipally 
owmid or operated stadium, auditorium, 
and similar property, 16 A. L. R. 2d 1376. 
Exemption from taxation of property of 
Boy Scout or Girl Scout organization, 116 
A. L. R. 378. 
Exemption of charitable organization 
from taxation, 108 A. L. R. 284. 
Exemption of part of real property as-
sessed or levied upon as a whole as affect-
ing tax upon nonexempt part, ll8 A. L. R. 
861. 
Exemption of property or bonds of houe-
ing authority from taxation, 133 A. L. R. 
365. 
Extent of area within tax exemption 
extended to property used for educational 
religious, or charitable purposes, 134 A'. 
L. R. 1176. 
Fraternal or relief association exemp-
tion of property of, 38 A. L. R. 36. 
L~asehold estate in exempt property as 
subJect of tax or special assessment, 23 
A. L. R. 248. 
Parsonage or residence of minister or 
priest, exemption, 13 A. L. R. 1196. 
Power of county or municipality to ex-
empt from taxation or otherwise aid or 
subsidize private enterprises conducted for 
recreational, exhibition or entertainment 
purposes, 116 A. L. R. 889. 
Power of state to tax debts due from 
United States under contracts other than 
loans, 30 A. L. R. 1462. 
:f'.roperty acquired by a taxing unit for 
delmquent taxes as exempt from taxation 
by another taxing unit, 162 A. L. R. ll19. 
Property located in one state, political 
subdivision or municipality, but belong-
ing to another, as subject to taxation 
therein, 99 A. L. R. 1143. 
Property used by personnel as Jiving 
quarters or for recreation purposes as 
within contemplation of tax exemptions 
extended to property of religious, educa-
tional, charitable, or hospital organiza-
tions, 15 A. L. R. 2d 1064. 
Property which religious or charitable 
body has no right to hold, exemption, 27 
A. L. R. 1047. 
Prospective use for religious or charit-
able purpose as rendering property exempt, 
2 A. L. R. 545. 
Public property not devoted to public 
use, taxation, 3 A. L. R. 1439. 
Religious body or society, construction 
of tax exemption provisions, 81 A. L. R. 
1178. 
EXEMPTIONS 59-2-3 
Scope and application of exemption of 
cemeteries from taxation, 168 A. L. R. 283. 
State tax on goods purchased by, or 
for benefit of, federal government, or on 
privilege of conducting business in con-
nection with which the sales are made, 56 
A. L. R. 587. 
Street, necessity of acceptance of dedi-
cation to exempt from taxation, 5 A. L. R. 
1537. 
Taxation of property owned by public 
body but not devoted to public use, 129 
A. L. R. 480. 
Tax exemption as affected by failure to 
claim or delay in claiming it for past years, 
115 A. L. R. 1484. 
Tax exemption as unconstitutionally im-
pairing public obligations antedating the 
exemption, 109 A. L. R. 817. 
Tax exemption in respect of property 
held subject to an express trust by a 
charitable, religious, or similar body gen-
erally within benefits of exemption, 138 
A. L. R. 116. 
Tax exemption of educational institu-
tions as extending to athletic fields or 
property used for social or recreation pur-
poses, 143 A. L. R. 274. 
Tax exemption of property of religious, 
educational, or charitable body as extend-
ing to property or income thereof used in 
publication or sale of literature, 154 A. 
L. R. 895. 
Tax or fee on or in respect of federal 
land banks' loans or securities, 29 A. L. 
R. 4. 
Time of acquisition of title by party en-
titled to tax exemption, effect, 63 A. L. R. 
1332. 
Use of property by lessee for tax-exempt 
purposes as affecting exemption, 157 A. 
L. R. 860. 
Validity and construction of statute or 
ordinance providing for relief of poor per-
sons from taxes, 123 A. L. R. 597. 
What is a cemetery within constitu-
tional or statutory tax exemption, 122 A. 
L. R. 901. 
What is a municipal corporation within 
constitutional or statutory tax exemption 
provisions, 108 A. L. R. 577. 
Y. M. C. A. or Y. W. C. A. property, 
exemption from taxation, 81 A. L. R. 1453. 
59-2-2. State lands-Improvements taxable.-N o tax shall be levied 
upon lands, the title to which remains in the state, held or occupied by 
any person under a contract of sale or lease from the state, but this pro-
vision shall not be construed to prevent the taxation of improvements on 
such lands and an interest therein to the extent of money paid, or due, in 
part payment of the purchase price thereof, whether an extension of 
payment has been granted or not prior to the levying of such tax. Where 
final payment has been made upon such lands, the contract of sale shall, for 
the purpose of taxation, be regarded as passing title to the purchaser or 
assignee, and the state land board shall immediately certify the receipt of 
such final payment to the state tax commission. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2502; sale of purchaser's interest by county for 
C. L. 1917, § 6862; L. 1919, ch. 113, § 1; taxes conveyed nothing. Stowell v. State, 
1921, ch. 132, § 1; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 100 U. 420, 115 P. 2d 914. 
80-2-2. 
1. State land sold on contract. 
State land sold on contract which retains 
title in state cannot be assessed, but only 
the improvements and the purchaser's in-
terest to the extent of payments made, 
whether extension of payment has been 
granted or not. Stowell v. State, 100 U. 
420, 115 P. 2d 914. 
Where state land board cancelled con-
tract of sale of state lands because of 
purchaser's default, the latter's interest 
in the property disappeared .and became 
nonexistent, and consequently purported 
2. Land acquired at foreclosure proceed-
ings. 
Lands, title to which is acqufred by the 
state by foreclosure of mortgage or con-
veyance for extinguishment of a debt for 
money loaned from the state school fund, 
are exempt from taxation. Duchesne 
County v. State Tax Comm., 104 U. 365, 
369, 140 P. 2d 335, 337. 
Collateral References. 
Taxatione-,197_ 
61 C.J. Taxation § 391. 
59-2-3. Collection of tax on interest of purchaser-CertLfi.cate of sale-
Effect of filed certificate.-Any tax levied on the interest of a purchaser 
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of state lands before title passes to such purchaser or his assignee, shall 
be collected in the same manner as taxes on personal property ancl the said 
interest shall be subject to sale for taxes in the same manner as personal 
property. 
Upon the sale of any such interest, the officer making such sale shall 
issue a certificate of sale, and such certificate or a certified copy thereof, 
upon being filed with the state land board, shall operate as an assignment 
of the interest of the original purchaser or his assignee in said contract to 
the purchaser at the tax sale. 
History: C. 1943, 80-2-2.10, enacted by 
L. 1945, ch. 108, § 1. 
Collateral References. 
TaxationP582. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 1372. 
59-2-4. Property in interstate commerce.-All property consigned to 
a consignee in this state from outside this state to be forwarded to a point 
outside this state, which is entitled under the tariffs, rules and regulations 
approved by the interstate commerce commission to be forwarded at through 
rates from the point of origin to the point of destination, if not detained 
within this state for a period of more than ninety days, shall be deemed 
to be property moving in interstate commerce, and no such property shall 
be subject to taxation in this state; provided, that personal property 
consigned for sale to any person within this state from any place out of 
this state must be assessed as any other personal property. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2526; 
C. L. 1917, § 5886; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
80-2-3. 
C. L. 1917, § 5866x, added by L. 1923, 
ch. 96, § 1; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 80-2-3. 
Collateral References. 
TaxationP197. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 391. 
Loading or unloading interstate freight 
in performance of obligation resting upon 
one other than interstate carrier as inter-
state commerce as regards local taxation, 
10 A. L. R. 2d 651. 
Property destined for, or in course of, 
removal from state as subject to taxation 
therein, 11 A. L. R. 2d 938. 
State taxation of livestock as affected 
by federal constitutional or statutory pro-
visions relating to imports, exports, or 
interstate commerce, 130 A. L. R. 969. 
State tax on or in respect of goods 
shipped in interstate commerce to con-
signee for sale on consignor's account 
without previous sale or order for pur-
chase, 4 A. L. R. 2d 244. 
When interstate transportation which ex• 
eludes state taxation is deemed to begin, 
25 A. L. R. 1201. 
59-2-5. Property owned by disa,bled veterans or their unmarried widows 
or minor orphans-Amount of exemption.-Tbe real and personal tangible 
property situated in this state owned by disabled persons who served in 
any war in the military service of the United States or of the state of 
Utah and by the unmarried widows and by the minor orphans of such 
persons, to the assessed value of, but not exceeding three thousand 
($3,000.00) dollars, is exempt from taxation subject to the conditions set 
forth in the following section. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 40, § 1; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 80-Z:.4; L. 1947, ch. 101, § 1; 
1948 (S. S.), ch. 10, § 1. 
Compiler's Notes. 
The 1947 amendment raised the exemp-
tion from $3,000 to $6,000. 
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The 1948 amendment reduced the exemp· 
tion from $6,000 back to $3,000, and added 
the word "assessed" in last part of section. 
Cross-Reference. 
Constitutional authorization, Const. Art. 
XIII,§ 2. 
EXEMPTIONS 59-2-7 
Collateral References. 
Taxation@=>197. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 391. 
Constitutionality, construction and ap-
plication of state statutes relating to ex• 
emption from taxation of amounts paid as 
pensions, war risk insurance, compensation, 
bonus or other relief for veterans of 
World War, 116 A. L. R. 1437. 
Exemption from taxation of money or 
proceeds of money paid by federal gov-
ernment under provisions of act for relief 
of veterans of World War, 76 A. L. R. 
981. 
Military service as basis of discrimina-
tion in statutes or ordinances relating to 
taxation or licenses, 83 A. L. R. 1231. 
59-2-6. Application-Proof-Percentage of disability-Minimum al-
lowed.-Every person applying for such exemption must, on or before 
May 1st, in each year, file an application for the same with the board of 
county commissioners of the county in which he resides, accompanied by a 
copy of the veteran's certificate of discharge from the military service of 
the Uuited States or of this state, or a certificate from the records of the 
Uuited States or of this state, or an affidavit from not less than three 
disinterested persons, that military service was renderell and that the 
disabled veteran or his unmarried widow or minor children are entitled 
to the exemption allowed. 
In case of application by veterans there shall also accompany such 
application a certificate from the United States Veterans' Bureau, or from 
such other source as the state tax commission may require, showing the 
percentage of disability of the applicant. If the applicant is one hundred 
per cent disabled, the full exemption shall be allowed. If the certificate 
shows a lesser percentage of disability the exemption allowed shall be 
that percentage of three thousand ($3,000.00) dollars. This amount shall 
be allowed regardless of the amount of property owned by the person 
receiving the exemption, except that no exemption shall be allowed for 
any disability below twenty-five per cent. Widows and minor orphans of 
deceased veterans shall be entitled to the full exemption. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 40, § 2; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 80-2-5; L. 1947, ch. 101, § 1; 
1948 (S. S.), ch. 10, § 1. 
c·ompiler's Notes. 
The 1947 amendment raised the exemp• 
tion from $3,000 to $6,000. 
The 1948 amendment reduced the exemp· 
tion to $3,000 and made other changes in 
text. 
Collateral References. 
Taxation@=>251. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 424. 
Tax exemption as affected by failure to 
claim or delay in claiming it for past 
years, 115 A. L. R. 1484. 
59-2-7. Pumping plants for irrigatio,n.-Power plants, power transmis-
sion lines and other property, used for generating and delivering electrical 
power, a portion of which is used for pumping water for the irrigation of 
lands in this state, are exempted from taxation to the extent that such 
property is used for such purposes. Such exemption shall accrue to the 
benefit of the users of water so pumped. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 41, § 1; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 80-2-6. 
1. Constitutionality. 
This section is constitutional. The in• 
terpretation placed thereon by the tax 
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commission may be accepted. Its validity 
was properly tested by prohibition, for 
declaratory judgment statute does not 
afford adequate remedy. Washington 
County v, State Tax Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 
P. 2d 564. 
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2. Construction and application. 
This section is to be construed as a 
whole and in connection with 59-2-8 and 
59-2-9. When so construed the basis for 
the exemption is the use to which the 
property is put. Washington County v. 
State Tax Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 P. 2d 564. 
The use to which the property is put 
does not mean that there must be a sep-
aration of the whole property into dif-
ferent parts according to whether each one 
of those parts is directly engaged in cre-
ating or carrying electrical euei·gy to 
pumpers. Neither the Constitution nor the 
statute provides that the portion used for 
pumping water for irrigation of lands may 
be (are) exempted from taxation. The 
words "a portion of which is used" are 
descriptive of the sort of plants, power 
transmission lines and other property 
which is to be the subject of exemption 
by the legislature. Washington County v. 
State Tax Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 P. 2d 564. 
"Power plants, power transmission lines 
no portion of which is used for pumping 
water for irrigation purposes" is not even 
the subject of the constitutional provision 
or the exemption. These words are de-
scriptive of the sort of electrical public 
utilities which are the subject of legisla-
tion, and it is incorrect to construe them 
as if they were a portion segregated for 
exem_ption. The operative words of both 
the Constitution and the statutes are those 
reading "to the extent that such property 
is used for such purposes." Washington 
County v. State Tax Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 
P. 2d 564. 
What is meant by "such property"f Not 
necessarily the portion directly used to 
create and transmit electrical energy to 
pumpers. "Such property" means power 
plants, power transmission lines and other 
property used for generating and deliver-
ing electrical power a portion of which is 
used for pumping purposes. In determin-
~ng the extent to which "such property" 
1s used for "such purposes," that is irri-
gation purposes, it is not necessary t~ pre-
sume that only that property which cre-
:i,tes and transmits the commingled energy 
1s used for "such purposes." Washington 
County v. State Tax Comm., 103 U. 73 
133 P. 2d 564. , ' 
The legislature, from an administrative 
standpoint, believed that it would be im• 
practicable to lop off certain parts of tho 
system over which it was claimed no 
mingled electrical energy flowed and those 
parts which it was claimed were unre-
lated to the production and distribution 
of the energy required for pumping from 
the system as a whole. Furthermore a 
system which is tied together and treated 
and operated as a unit and from which a 
gross revenue is produced as a unit has 
its valuation for taxing purposes based in 
part on its unitary earnings. Washington 
County v. State Tax Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 
P. 2d 564. 
Collateral References. 
Taxation~197. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 391. 
59-2-8. Computation of power used for irrigation.-The state tax 
commission shall ascertain the total amount of electric power in kilowatt 
hours distributed by each distributor thereof for all purposes within this 
state, and the total amount of electric power in kilowatt hours distributed 
and used for pumping water exclusively for the irrigation of lands within 
this state by each such distributor; and from the total property assessment 
on all properties assessed within this state so used for generating and 
distributing electrical power by each such distributor the state tax com-
mission shall make an exemption of the percentage thereof which the 
total amount of electric power in kilowatt hours so distributed by each 
such distributor and used exclusively for pumping water for irrigation 
purposes bears to the total amount of electric power distributed by such 
distributor for all purposes within this state. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 41, § 2; R. S. 1933 
& C. 1943, 80-2-7. 
1. Constitutiona,lity. 
This section is constitutional. Further-
more, the contemporaneous construction 
placed upon this section by the state tax 
commission, long acquiesced in and uni-
form, is persuasive of its constitutionality. 
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Washington County v. State Tax Comm., 
103 U. 73, 133 P. 2d 564. 
The formula prescribed by this section, 
when read in connection with 59-2-7 as it 
must be, does not contain elements which 
have no relevancy to the end to be arrived 
at. Washington County v. State Tax 
Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 P. 2d 564. 
EXEMPTIONS 59-2-11 
2. Authority of commission. 
The authority of the state tax commis-
sion to apply the formula set out in this 
section for ascertaining the amount of 
money to be refunded to pumpers of irri-
gation water depends upon the constitu-
tionality of that section. This may be 
tested by writ of prohibition in absence of 
adequate remedy at law, and declaratory 
judgment does not afford adequate remedy. 
The interpretation placed thereon by the 
commission was accepted, and, as so inter-
preted, the section was held constitutional. 
Of course the formula prescribed by the 
legislature under the authority of this sec-
tion cannot ignore the express words of 
Art. XIII, § 2 of the Constitution. Wash-
ington County v. State Tax Comm., 103 
U. 73, 133 P. 2d 564. 
If each landowner were required to gen-
erate and distribute his own electrical 
energy for pumping his own irrigation 
water, the whole of it would be exempt 
under this section. Likewise, if one or 
several irrigation companies were organ-
ized to generate and distribute electri~al 
energy solely for the purpose of pumping 
water, such property would be fully ex-
empt from taxation. What the legislature 
intended to do was to treat for taxation 
purposes such portion of property as was 
used by a power company to . furnish 
power to pumpers as if it, in effect, bP-
longed to the pumpers. Washington County 
v. State Tax Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 P. 2d 
564. 
The valuation of the property as a unit. 
by the state tax commission is discussed 
at length in Washington County v. State 
Tax Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 P. 2d 564. 
Collateral References. 
Taxatione:=>197. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 391. 
59-2-9. Exemption to be prorated and paid to users.-'rhe total amount 
of tax saved to each distributor by such exemption shall be prorated anc1 
paid by such distributor to the users of its power for pumping water for 
irrigation purposes, ratably according to the amount of power so useLl 
for such purposes by each such user. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 41, § 3; R. S. 1933 2. Power for irrigation purposes. 
& C. 1943, 80-2-8. 
1. Constitutionality. 
This section is constitutional. The in-
terpretation placed thereon by the tax 
commission may be accepted. Its validity 
was properly tested by writ of prohibition, 
for declaratory judgment statute does not 
afford adequate remedy at law. Washing-
ton County v. State Tax Comm., 103 U. 
73, 133 P. 2d 564. 
Under this section, the state tax com· 
mission is not required to break down a 
unitary system into its component parts 
before applying the formula prescribed by 
59-2-8. Washington County v. State Tax 
Comm., 103 U. 73, 133 P. 2d 564. 
Collateral References. 
Taxatione:=>197. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 391. 
59-2-10. Rules by state ta..,c commission.-'rhe state tax commission 
may adopt and enforce such rules and regulations as may be necessary to 
determine such exemption and to provide for the prorating of the benefits 
thereof. 
History: L. 1931, ch. 41, § 4; R. S. 1933 
& c. 1943, 80-2-9. 
Collateral References. 
Taxatione:=>197. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 391. 
59-2-11. Household furnishings exempt from taxation.-Household 
furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof 
at his place of abode in maintaining a home for himself and family not 
exceeding in value the sum of $300 is exempted from all taxation. 
History: L. 1939, ch. 97, § 1; C. 1943, furnishings, furniture, and equipment from 
80-2-10. taxation. 
Title of Act. Effective Date. 
An act exempting certain household Section 2 of Laws 1939, ch. 97 (Code 
1943, 80-2-11) provided that act should 
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take effect on the first day of January Collateral References. 
1940. TaxationP224. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 439. 
50-2-12. Exemption of pro·perty owned by blind persons or their un-
married widows or minor orphans-Amount.-The real and personal 
tangible property situated in this state owned by blind persons and by 
the unmarried widows and by the minor orphans of such persons of the 
value of, but not exceeding two thousand dollars assessed valuation for 
homes and homesteads and $300 for personal property, is exempt from 
taxation subject to the condition set forth in the following section. 
History: L. 1949, ch. 85, § 1; C. 1943, erty, and providing for procedures to ear• 
Supp., 80-2:-12. ry out the provisions of this act. 
Title of Act. Cross-Reference. 
Constitutional authorization of exemp• 
tion of homes, homesteads and personal 
property generally, Const. Art. XIII, § 2. 
An act to exempt blind persons and the 
widows and minor orphans of deceased 
blind persons from the payment of taxes 
upon all real and personal tangible prop-
erty, not to exceed in valuation the sum Collateral References. 
of $2,000 assessed valuation for homes and TaxationP219. 
homesteads, and $300 for personal prop- 61 C.J. 'faxation § 433. 
59-2-13. Procedure and conditions-Filing of application and statement 
as to vision-Maximum corrected vision allowed.-Every person applying 
for such exemption must, on or before May 1st, in each year, file an 
application for the same with the board of county commissioners of the 
county in which he resides, accompanied by a statement signed by a 
registered [ ophthalmologist], that he has no more than 20/200 visual 
acuity in the better eye corrected, or that in the case of better than 20/200 
central vision there is a restriction of the field of vision in the better eye 
which subtends an angle of vision no greater than 20 degrees. This 
amount shall be allowed regardless of the amount of property owned by 
the person receiving the exemption. Widows and minor orphans of the 
blind deceased person shall be entitled to the full exemption. 
History: L. 1949, ch. 85, § 2; C. 1943, Collateral References. 
Supp., 80-2-13. TaxationP219. 
Compiler's Note. 
The bracketed word "ophthalmologist" 
was inserted by the compiler to correct an 
error in spelling. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 433. 
CHAPTER 3 
DEFINITIONS 
Section 59-3-1. "Property," "real estate," "improvements," "personal property," 
"value," defined. 
59-3-1. "Property," "real estate," "improvements/' "personal property," 
"value," defined.-In this title, unless the context or subject-matter other-
wise requires : 
(1) "Property" means property which is subject to assessment and 
taxation according to its value, and does not include moneys, credits, 
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bonds, stocks, representative property, franchises, good will, copyrights, 
patents, or other things commonly known as intangibles. 
(2) "Real estate" includes 
(a) The possession of, claim to, ownership of or right to the possession 
of, land. 
(b) All mines, minerals, and quarries in aud under the land, all 
timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or being on the 
lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges 
appertaining thereto. 
( c) Improvements. 
(3) "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences 
and improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title 
has been acquired to the land or not. 
( 4) "Personal property" includes 
(a) Every class of property as defined in subsection (1) hereof which 
is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning of the 
terms "real estate" and "improvements." 
(b) Gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets or alleys. 
( c) Bridges and ferries. 
(5) "Value" and "full cash value" mean the amount at which the 
property would be taken in payment of a just debt due from a solvent 
debtor. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, §§ 2505, 
2534, 2535; C. L. 1917, §§ 5865, 5893, 5894; 
L. 1931, ch. 42, § 1; R. S. 1933 & C. 1943, 
8Qc.3-1. 
Cross-Reference.s. 
Constitutional provision, Coust. Art. 
XIII, § 2. 
Railroad rolling stock as personalty, 
Const. Art: XII, § 14. 
1. Double taxation. 
This section as it formerly read, and 
Art. XIII, § 2 of the Constitution of this 
state prior to its amendment in 1930, for-
bade double taxation. McCornick & Co. 
v. Bassett, 49 U. 444, 164 P. 852, applying 
Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 2505-2509. 
But "double taxation means taxing the 
same property twice." Stillman v. Lynch, 
56 U. 540, 551, 192 P. 272, 12 A. L. R. 
552. 
When property of corporation has been 
taxed, its stock is nontaxable. Stillman 
v. Lynch, 56 U. 540, 192 P. 272, 12 A. L. 
R. 552. 
The taxation of title retaining notes and 
conditional sales agreements does not 
amount to double taxation. Stillm::m v. 
Lynch, 56 U. 540, 192 P. 272, 12 A. L. R. 
552. 
2. "Property." 
The term "property," as defined by 
Comp. Laws 1907, § 2505, included not only 
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money, but eredit.s. In re Thourot's Estate, 
52 U. 106, 110, 172 P. 697. 
3. "Real estate." 
An engine and boiler built into a brick 
foundation, and firmly affixed by bolts 
leaded down and used in underground 
workings of a mine, are included in term 
"real estate." Mammoth Min. Co. v. Juab 
County, 10 U. 232, 37 P. 348. 
4. Value. 
Formerly the Compiled Laws contained 
special provisions for the assessment and 
taxation of shares of bank stock, which, 
however, have been repealed, and subdivi-
sion (1) of this section is broad enough to 
warrant their assessment without the aid 
of special legislation. Such "property" 
is personal property. See McCornick & 
Co. v. Bassett, 49 U. 444, 164 P. 852, apply-
ing Comp. Laws 1907, §§ 2505-2509, which 
have been repealed. They were formerly 
part of title "Revenue and Taxation." 
Under subdivision (5) of this section, 
the market value, and not the asset value, 
should have been taken as the basis for 
assessment of bank shares. Continental 
Nat. Bank v. Naylor, 54 U. 49, 63, 179 
P. 67. 
This provision, together with others, is 
sufficient to carry out the constitutional 
mandate that the legislature shall pre-
scribe by law such regulations as will 
secure a just valuation for taxation of 
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property. If these provisions are fol-
lowed, all property will bear an equal 
burden of taxation in proportion to its 
value. Crystal Car Line v. State Tax 
Comm., 110 U. 426, 174 P. 2d 984, 990. 
5. Bank deposits. 
Under former statute, bank deposits 
were assessed to depositors as solvent 
eredits, and from sum total of his eredits 
taxpayer was entitled to deduction of sueh 
debts as were owing by him. Roberts v. 
Lunch, 56 U. 346, 190 P. 930. 
Collateral References. 
Taxation<S=:>58. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 118. 
Definitions and distinguishing character-
istics, 51 Am. Jnr. 34, Taxation § 2 et seq. 
Books or records of title abstracts as 
subject of property taxes, 149 A. L. R. 
1038. 
Conditional sales in relation to taxation, 
110 A. L. R. 1499. 
Discretion of court or referee as to mode 
of valuation of real property for tax pur-
poses, 152 A. L. R. 611. 
Discrimination between notes or obliga-
tions secUl'ed by real estate mortgage, and 
those unsecured, as regards property taxa-
tion or exemption therefrom, 129 A. L. R. 
682. 
Discrimination for purposes of property 
taxation between agricultural lands and 
other real property, 111 A. L. R. 1486. 
Gambling devices, contraband, or other 
illegally held personal property, as subject 
to taxation, 160 A. L. R. 1225. 
General property tax in respect of royal-
ties and other interests (apart from inter-
est of lessee) under oil and gas lease, 128 
A. L. R. 851. 
Land trust certificates, validity of tax 
on, 100 A. L. R. 804. 
Leasehold interest as real property with• 
in tax laws, 59 A. L. R. 701. 
Liability for taxes accruing after exe-
cution of contract for sale of land and 
before conveyance, 12 A. L. R. 41,1. 
Meaning of association or joint stock 
company within statutes taxing associa-
t~ons or j_oint stock companies as corpora-
t10ns ("Massachusetts" or business trusts), 
144 A. L. R. 1050. 
Mortgage on property of taxpayer who 
is not personally lia.ble as "debt" for pur-
poses of taxing statute, 107 A. L. R. 1310. 
Oil and gas rights or privileges as inde-
pendent subject of taxat:on, or as tangible 
property for purposes of taxation, 16 A. L. 
R. 513. 
Oil and gas royalty as real or personal 
property, 101 A. L. R. 884. 
Power of state to tax royalties from 
patents, 55 A. L. R. 931. 
Rights and duties between landlord and 
tenant in respect of taxes 01· assessments 
in absence of stipulation in lease in that 
regard, 73 A. L. R. 824. 
Rights appurtenant, easements, restric-
tions, or charges in respect of land as 
factors in assessment of real property for 
property taxation, 108 A. L. R. 829. 
Righ€s of insured or beneficiary under 
insurance policy as subject to property tax, 
150 A. L. R. 788. 
Royalty interest reserved by conveyance 
or lease of oil and gas rights as real or 
personal property, 90 A. L. R. 770. 
. Taxation of chattels and conditional sale 
contracts or title retaining notes given in 
respect of them, 12 A. L. R. 566. 
Taxation of land under perpetual lease 
or ground rent, 55 A. L. R. 154. 
What are "financial corporations" or 
"moneyed institutions" within state tax 
laws, 145 A. L. R. 354. 
CHAPTER 4 
SITUS 
Section 59-4-1. Situs of tangible property. 
59-4-2. Public utilities, bridges, ferries, canals. 
59-4-1. Situs of tangible property.-All taxable property must be 
assessed in the county, city, town or district in which it is situated. Motor 
vehicles and aircraft, except those assessed by the tax commission, shall 
be assessed in the county, city, town or district in which the owner thereof 
is domiciled in this state on the 1st day of January; provided, however, 
that motor vehicles and aircraft usually used or kept in a taxing unit 
other than that of the domicile of the owner shall be assessed in such other 
taxing unit. Land must be assessed in parcels or subdivisions not exceeding 
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six hundred forty acres each, and tracts of land containing more than six 
hundred forty acres, which have been sectionized by the United States 
government, must be assessed by sections or fractions of sections. 
History: R. s. 1898 & C. L. 1907, § 2515; 4. -property of nonresident decedent. 
c. L. 1917, § 5875; R. S. 1933, 80-4-1; L. Property of nonresident consisting of 
1935, ch. 81, § 1; C. 1943, 80-4-1. money in bank and certificates of deposit 
Compiler's Note. 
The .. 1935 amendment inserted second 
sentence. 
Cross-Reference. 
Constitutional provision, Const. Art. 
XIII, § 10. 
1. Situs, domicile of owner. 
Fiction of law that all intangible prop-
erty is presumed to have its situs at own-
er's domicile must give way in face of 
contrary facts. In re Thourot's Estate, 52 
U. 106, Ill, 172 P. 697. . 
Where legal situs of personal property 
such as notes and bonds is at domicile of 
owner, such property may be taxed ~o 
such owner in state where he has his 
domicile. Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt 
Lake County, 60 U. 491, 210 P. 106, 27 A. 
L. R. 874. 
With respect to personal property of 
a tangible and corporeal nature and cap-
able of having a situs of its own, residence 
of owner is generally immaterial, and 
property is taxable where it is found. 
Hamilton & Gleason Co. v. Emery County, 
75 U. 406, 409, 285 P. 1006. See Union 
Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18 U. 
378, 55 P. 639, 48 L. R . .A.. 790, aff'd 177 
U. S. 149, 44 L. Ed. 708, 20 S. Ct. 631. 
2. - location of property. 
Term "owned," as used in Const. Art. 
xm, § IO, which provide_s that all p_er-
sons in state shall be subJect to taxation 
on real and personal property "owned" 
or used by them within territorial limits 
of authority levying tax, has reference to 
place where property is, and not to where 
owner may reside, and sheep were not 
assessable in certain city where one of 
them had been within territorial limits of 
city at any time during period for which 
taxes were assessed. Murdock v. Murdock, 
38 U. 373, 113 P. 330. . 
3. - corporate stock. 
State has right to fix, for purposes of 
taxation, situs of stock of corporation 
doing business within its limits. Commer-
cial Nat. Bank v. Chambers, 21 U. 324, 61 
P. 560, 56 L. R. .A.. 346, aff'd 182 U. S. 556, 
45 L. Ed. 1227, 21 S. Ct. 863. 
The situs of corporate stock for differ-
ent purposes is set forth in Untermyer v. 
State Tax Comm., 102 U. 214, 129 P. 2d 
881. 
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which was under exclusive a.nd absolute 
contl'ol of executor was within jurisdic-
tion of state during time of administration 
for purposes of taxation. In re Thourot's 
Estate, 52 U. 106, 172 P. 697. 
5. - roUing stock of railroads. 
As against contention of foreign cor-
poration that taxation of its refrigerator 
cars in Utah was forbidden by federal 
Constitution because such cars had no situs 
in that state for purpose of taxation and 
tax on them would impose burden on inter-
state commerce, held that cars were tax-
able in Utah on basis of average number 
thereof used and employed by their owner 
in that state during year for which assess-
ment was made. Union Refrigerator Tran-
sit Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149, 44 L. Ed. 
708, 20 S. Ct. 631 (White, J., not partici-
pating), aff'g 18 U. 378, 55 P. 639, and 
followed in Crystal Car Line v. State Tax 
Comm., 110 U. 426, 174 P. 2d 984. 
6. - water rights. 
Where flow of percolating waters was 
developed in process of mining operations, 
which water was piped and sold to another 
company who took such water in another 
county and through its own pipes con-
ducted it to its own mine, water rights 
were properly assessed against mining 
company selling such water in county in 
which its operations were conducted and 
in county where water was transferred 
and tax apportioned between such coun-
ties. Utah Metal & Tunnel Co. v. Groes-
beck, 62 U. 251, 219 P. 248. 
7. Property of foreign corporations. 
While in taxing property of foreign cor-
poration which is fa taxing state latter 
state may look beyond its borders so that 
it may get true value of things within 
state, it may do so only to obtain true 
value of property in taxing state. Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake County, 60 
U. 491, 210 P. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874. 
Neither tangible nor intangible property 
owned and used by foreign corporation in 
states other than Utah was taxable in 
Utah county, where principal office of cor-
poration was situated. Utah-Idaho Sugar 
Co. v. Salt Lake County, 60 U. 491, 210 
P. 106, 27 .A.. L. R. 874. 
8. Property in several counties. 
Where corporation owned factories, and 
property used in connection therewith, 
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which were situated in different counties, 
its so called in tangible property could not 
be assessed in lump sum and apportioned 
among several counties. Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake County, 60 U. 491, 
210 P. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874. 
9, Boundaries o.f taJting district. 
Fixing of boundaries of taxing district 
and its area is wholly matter of legisla-
tive discretion, and exercise of such dis-
cretion is not subject of judicial investi-
gation or revision. Kimball v. Grantsville 
City, 19 U. 368, 57 P. 1, 45 L. R. A. 628. 
10. Doctrine of unity of use. 
The doctrine of unity of use for pur-
pose of determining assessment for taxa-
tion cannot be applied to manufacturing 
or other similar plants or industries which 
may be under common ownership but used 
or operated in different states. Utah-
Idaho Sugar Co. v. Salt Lake County, 60 
U. 491, 210 P. 106, 27 A. L. R. 874. 
Collateral References. 
Taxation~98. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 206. 
Place of taxation, 51 Am. Jur. 456, Taxa-
tion § 441 et seq. 
"Business situs" for purposes of prop-
erty taxation of intangibles in state other 
than domicil of owner, 143 A. L. R. 361. 
Different parts or parcels of land in 
same ownership as single unit or separate 
units for tax assessment purposes, 133 A. 
L. R. 524. 
Review of decisions of United States 
Supreme Court since Union Refrigerator 
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 
50 L. Ed. 150, 26 S. Ct. 36, on situs of 
personal property for purposes of taxa-
tion, 123 A. L. R. J 79. 
Situs as between different states or coun-
tries of bank deposits for purposes of 
property taxation, 59 A. L. R. 1046. 
Situs as between different states or coun-
tries of tangible chattels for purposes of 
property taxation, 110 A. L. R. 707. 
Situs for property taxation as between 
· different governmental units within state 
of . personal property or interests therein 
held by trustees, executors, or administra-
tors, 129 A. L. R. 273. 
Situs for property taxation as between 
different states or countries of personal 
property, or interests therein, held by 
trustees, executors, or administrators, 127 
A. L. R. 379. 
Situs of aeroplanes for purposes of taxa-
tion, 153 A. L. R. 264. 
Situs of membership in exchange or 
board of trade, 17 A. L. R. 89. 
Situs of vessels for tax purposes, 6 A. 
L. R. 2d 1367. 
When individual deemed an "inhabitant" 
of the state within taxing law, 53 A. L. R. 
1394. 
Where wrecked vessel taxable, 8 A. L. R. 
663. 
59-4-2. Public utilities, bridges, ferries, canals.-Public utilities, rail-
roads, street railroads, car, telegraph and telephone lines, and bridges and 
ferries not public utilities, when operated wholly in one county; and electric 
light lines and similar improvements, canals, ditches and flumes when 
separately taxable, must be listed and assessed in the county in which 
such property is located. 
History: R. S. 1898 & C. L. 1907, §§ 2535, 
2536; C. L. 1917, §§ 5894, 5895; L. 1931, 
ch. 42, § 1; 1931, ch. 63, § 1; R. S. 1933 & 
c. 1943, 80-4-2. 
Cross-Re.ferences. 
Assessments by state tax commission, 
59-5-3, 59-5-46. 
Constitutional provision, Const. Art. 
XIII, § 10. 
1. Railroad rolling stock. 
As against contention of foreign corpor-
ation that taxation of its refrigerator cars 
in Utah was forbidden by federal Constitu-
tion because such cars had no situs in that 
state for purpose of taxation and tax on 
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them would impose burden on interstate 
commerce, held that cars were taxable in 
Utah on basis of average number thereof 
used and employed by their owner in that 
state during year for which assessment 
was made. Union Refrigerator Transit 
Co. v. Lynch, 177 U. S. 149, 44 L. Ed. 708, 
20 S. Ct. 631 (White, J., not participat-
ing), aff'g 18 U. 378, 55 P. 639. 
Collateral References. 
Taxationc8=>98. 
61 C.J. Taxation § 206. 
Place for taxation of dam, flowage 
rights, or water power, 64 A. L. R. 143. 
